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A strategic blendU.S. military planners plot how to defeat Saddam
The following is a text adaptation of a joint CNN Presents/New York Times special report, "Showdown: Iraq." (CNN) -- Having scored a resounding victory more than a decade ago in Operation Desert Storm, Pentagon planners are once again devising strategies to throttle Iraq's armed forces.But while the United States -- if it goes to war with Iraq again -- would hope to match the success of the Persian Gulf War, they would not replicate its approach, experts say. Not only would the U.S. military lose the element of surprise, say experts, but the goals of military action this time around are far different than they were in 1991. Unlike the Gulf War, this Bush administration has publicly advocated "regime change" -- an aim that would likely require tracking down Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in one of his bunkers or presidential palaces, most of which are located in Iraq's vast capital of 5 million people. "This is not going to be the re-fight of the Gulf War, with tanks rolling through the desert and ... the war being declared over well before you ever get to Baghdad," said New York Times national security correspondent Eric Schmitt. "Baghdad is the prize of this campaign." Washington is considering several strategies to unseat Saddam, defeat his armed forces and destroy his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. Each plan must take into account several complicating factors, including Saddam's stated desire to lure U.S. troops into urban warfare and the threat that he could resort to weapons of mass destruction. "In this war, Saddam may very well use chemical weapons, because he knows he has nothing much to lose," said Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based policy research organization. "We're coming after his head anyway. In the Gulf War, he chose not to use these because he was warned that, if he did, we would overthrow his regime." This past year, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld solicited plans from military brass on how to overthrow Saddam. While none of the plans were made public, Pentagon sources said Rumsfeld considered three distinct invasion models and that the final plan would likely combine elements of all three. Learning from Desert Storm, Afghanistan
All the scenarios start in the air, sources say, with U.S. and coalition aircraft launching strikes on Iraqi military and possible weapons installations from Navy carriers in the Persian Gulf and bases in Turkey, Kuwait and, ideally, Saudi Arabia. (The Saudis have said they will allow U.S. forces to launch strikes from their territory only if the United Nations approves military action, while Turkey has expressed reservations about unsanctioned action.) The first ground invasion plan that Rumsfeld received, according to Pentagon sources, mimicked the Desert Storm strategy but with half the number of troops -- 250,000, versus a half-million in 1991. The plan, requiring months to build up and position forces and relying heavily on military bases in neighboring nations, would climax in a multi-pronged assault from the north, south and west into Iraq. Sources said Rumsfeld rejected the plan, deemed "Desert Storm Light," as too slow and too conventional, fearing it would give Saddam too much time to react -- be it by attacking Israel, using chemical weapons or repositioning his forces. The second plan resembled the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, in which the United States would lean heavily on its Special Forces and would arm, train and fight alongside anti-Saddam fighters inside Iraq. About 50,000 Kurdish troops in northern Iraq and a smaller group of Shi'ite opposition forces in southern Iraq have some independence in the U.N.-mandated no-fly zones inside which Iraqi forces are prohibited. "Those opposition forces and American Special Forces [would] begin to leave the sanctuaries of northern, eastern and southeastern Iraq and move toward the central region of the country, where Saddam's forces are located," O'Hanlon said. The United States and its allies would "try to draw out the Iraqi Republican Guard and army forces wherever possible, then attack them from the air as you draw them out." But experts said that what worked so well in Afghanistan might fail in Iraq. Iraqi opposition groups do not control as much land or possess the same firepower or organization as the Northern Alliance, and Saddam's military is a more formidable force than the Taliban. Taking Baghdad
The boldest strategy, according to Pentagon sources, involves landing 50,000 to 100,000 U.S. troops in the heart of Baghdad at the outset of the war. Referred to as "Inside Out," this plan aims to quickly unseat Saddam, defeat his elite forces and thus lessen the threat of an attack involving weapons of mass destruction. But while the idea of cutting the head off first appeals to strategists, experts warn that the plan carries tremendous risk. "You're banking on getting in and seizing your objectives -- finding Saddam, for instance -- and taking over a city [without] getting bogged down in urban warfare," said Schmitt. U.S. and allied forces would face many perils fighting in Bagdhad, Schmitt said, including getting stuck in a place where they cannot be resupplied or whisked away to safety, having helicopters shot down or suffering heavy casualties against a foe who knows the tight quarters well. Others say this argument is irrelevant: U.S. forces must go into Baghdad regardless, whether they enter the Iraqi capital at the beginning or end of the campaign. The large, sprawling city has many places for forces loyal to Saddam to hide, and thus prolong the U.S.-led invasion. "It's a horizontal city, and if you could visualize a military campaign being conducted in Los Angeles, you get some idea of the technical problems associated with carrying out this kind of an operation," said Ret. Gen. Joseph Hoar, a commander of U.S. Central Command during the 1990s. Parts of all three strategies, sources say, will likely be weaved into the final U.S. military plan. In conjunction with a massive air assault, Special Forces would work alongside Iraqi dissidents, a swarm of troops would quickly strike Baghad and a larger group of ground troops would roll into Iraq in the final phase. The combination would ideally add up to a blitzkrieg that, ideally, would last days and not weeks, Pentagon sources say. Complicating factorsThe quality of U.S. intelligence, spirit of Iraqi forces and amount of resources the United States commits to the campaign could all factor into the final outcome. Iraq's armed forces surrendered fairly quickly in the Gulf War, but they can be expected to put up more of a fight the closer that U.S. forces get to Baghdad, experts say. "The thinking is that the regular Iraqi army, the ones ... sitting out there in the desert, would fold pretty quickly," said Schmitt. "But as you move up the echelons within the Iraqi military, it becomes more difficult to predict exactly what and where things are going to break." Spotty U.S. intelligence on the location and extent of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could also play a major role, especially if Saddam is able to fire such weapons before U.S. forces can destroy them. Lastly, some U.S. politicians, led by former Vice President Al Gore, have warned that a prolonged campaign in Iraq will divert the U.S. military's time and resources from what should be its top priority: rooting out al Qaeda, the terrorist group behind the September 11 terrorist attacks. The task of simultaneously fighting the war on terrorism in many places worldwide -- including the Philippines, Djibouti, Afghanistan and back in the United States -- could also be dangerous if the military is stretched too thin and a given operation does not have the necessary resources, said Hoar. "There is no doubt that we have the means and the willingness and the capability to prevail," he said. "If you try to do it on the cheap, the risk goes up and cost of American lives goes up."
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