Beijing's marching orders

China's massive armed forces are becoming increasingly assertive in domestic politics

HONG KONG, China (CNN) -- Much of the delicate relationship between the army and the Communist Party leadership can be seen from a discussion last week between Vice-President Hu Jintao and a group of demobilized soldiers.

While touring southwestern Yunnan Province, Hu found time to reassure the decommissioned rank and file that Beijing would find them employment and take care of their families.

This is despite the fact that, given Beijing's numerous instructions that localities give top priority to finding jobs for demobilized soldiers, the latter are already much better off than workers laid off by state-owned enterprises.

At the same time, Hu, a Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), stressed the need for soldiers to "heed the overall [national] situation, share the burden of the state, and use concrete action to safeguard stability and unity."

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As military and civilian units are about to celebrate the August 1 Army Day -- and the last stage of preparations for the pivotal 16th Communist Party Congress gets underway -- the problematic relationship between the army on the one hand and the party and state on the other is brought into sharp focus.

There is growing evidence that the 3.5 million-strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) and its side-kick, the 1 million-strong People's Armed Police (PAP) are exerting more influence in domestic politics as well as foreign and Taiwan affairs.

This is despite the oft-repeated instruction by President Jiang Zemin, also CMC Chairman, that the PLA must submit to the "absolute leadership" of the party.

Yet if, contrary to the democratization process in most developing countries, the PLA is becoming increasingly assertive and politicized, the main culprit is none other than the president and party chief.

Unquestioned loyalty

Like Mao Zedong before, Jiang has taken advantage of the special nature of the forces -- particularly their unquestioned loyalty to authority -- to achieve personal ambitions.

It was in the barracks that the campaign to study Jiang's "Theory of the Three Represents" ("the party must represent the highest productivity, the most advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the broadest masses") first reached fever pitch.

While sectors such as workers and peasants have attacked Jiang for putting the "new classes" before the proletariats, military officers have called Jiang's dictum "the basis of the party, the foundation of the administration and the source of [national] strength."

Chief Political Commissar General Yu Yongbo has praised "Three Represents" as "rich in content, profound in thought, exquisite in argument, and sparkling with the spirit of the times."

And it is also within the PLA that Jiang's aides have erected a Mao-style personality cult around the president.

Since late last year, the generals have led the nation in calling for Jiang, 75, to remain in both his party and army positions "for the sake of the stability of the overall situation and the good of the nation."

'Undying support'

Question marks remain over the military's feelings toward Hu Jintao and the upcoming 'Fourth Generation' of leaders

In private meetings, much-decorated generals such as CMC vice-chairman Zhang Wannian and General Yu had vowed their "undying support for the core of the Third Generation leadership."

While Jiang is supposed to hand over the baton to Hu, known as the core of the Fourth Generation, or younger, leadership, officers such as Zhang or Yu have very seldom made reference to either Hu or the Fourth Generation.

On a practical level, Jiang is beholden to the men in uniform for extending the Communist party's proverbial mandate of heaven.

Had it not been for the "resolute action" of the PAP -- and in some instances regular soldiers -- disgruntled workers from Daqing Oilfield and other hotspots in the rust-belt northeastern provinces might have descended upon the capital last March.

The PLA is also the administration's last resort regarding increasingly frequent instances of what Chinese call tianzai renhuo ("heavenly calamities and man-made disasters).

Without the PLA and PAP's helping hand, mishaps ranging from flooding and horrendous fires to high-casualty mining accidents could have wrecked the ship of state.

In return, Jiang has been giving goodies galore to China's soldiers -- identified by late patriarch Deng Xiaopoing after the June 4, 1989 crackdown as "the loveliest people of them all."

Apart from massive annual budget boosts, the PLA is vouchsafed hefty political clout.

Political sources in Beijing say PLA officers are guaranteed their traditional 20% or so share of the Central Committee seats that will be picked at the 16th congress.

Top brass lobbying Jiang

The top brass is also lobbying Jiang for Politburo seats for senior generals Cao Gangchuan, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou.

Equally significant, the officers seem to be having a bigger say on Taiwan and foreign affairs.

For example, generals interviewed by foreign and Hong Kong newsmen who were recently allowed to tour army facilities outside Tianjin and Beijing cockily expressed confidence in their ability to "liberate Taiwan" any time.

The army media is also replete with denunciations of alleged American efforts to "encircle and contain China."

And military expert Tian Xin has told the official media that the "China-bashing" reports recently released by the Pentagon and Congress were manifestations of "unilateralism" and "imperialism" as well as an effort to influence Chinese politics prior to the 16th congress.

It is true that tough messages issued by PLA officers and commentators are often part of a psychological warfare against Taiwan and the U.S.

However, Jiang, who has frequently been criticized by military firebrands for being "too soft" on the U.S. and Taiwan, has also given repeated orders to PLA officers to be cautious when speaking out.

For example, immediately after the so-called spy plane incident of April 2001, Jiang gave a blanket order to the generals to either keep mum on Sino-U.S. relations or just repeat editorials in party papers.

Yet the voice of the generals has become louder in proportion to Jiang's reliance on their support.

Bearing the burden

The question of PLA's overweening ways will become more serious under Hu, who will supposedly assume the CMC leadership in the not-too-distant future.

The vice-president's military experience is limited to the several years in the 1980s when he was party chief of Guizhou Province and the Tibet Autonomous Region, as well as political commissar of the respective military districts.

While Hu may have developed friendship with generals who have served in the northwest or southwestern provinces, the number of such officers -- as well as their personal bonds -- is probably limited.

And while Hu became CMC vice-chairman three years ago, he has been kept out of the loop by Jiang and other members of the latter's Shanghai Faction.

Among senior members of Hu's own faction, only Fujian party secretary Song Defu, who joined the PLA in 1965, has substantial military credentials.

Yet Song, also a former Minister of Personnel, left the forces in 1983 and his relationship with the top brass is tenuous.

The upshot is that Hu may have no choice but to continue plying the officers with favors so as to retain their loyalty.

And it is most unlikely that the generals, long accustomed to a lopsided share of the pie, will listen to the vice-president's call last week to "heed the overall situation and bear the burden of the state."