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China waits for 'real reform' to blossom
By CNN Senior China Analyst Willy Wo-Lap Lam
(CNN) -- The 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress may prove disappointing to those who hope the watershed conclave will set a bold new agenda for political reform. The final drafts of the Political Report that President Jiang Zemin will deliver to the congress next month show the party elite is only interested in improving -- and strengthening -- strict one-party rule. This is despite the fact that according to Beijing sources familiar with the drafting of the key document, there will be a long section devoted to "reform of the political structure." Jiang will recommend new methods to promote transparency and supervision in order to crack down on corruption and faulty decision-making. Yet, despite the party's decision to recruit new members from amongst the "new classes" of businessmen and professionals, the reforms anticipated by the Jiang leadership have very little to do with Western-style political liberalization such as popular participation in politics or putting together power-sharing and checks-and-balance mechanisms. Moreover, the conservative view that the CCP can be rendered better and stronger through "internal, within-the-system reforms" -- not democratization -- seems to be shared by younger cadres tipped to take over at the 16th Congress such as Vice-President Hu Jintao and Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao. Take for example, the party's proposal for ameliorating its singularly ineffective anti-corruption institutions. The CCP's highest anti-graft watchdog is the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI), which is usually headed by a Politburo Standing Committee member. Curbing corruptionForeign legal experts have pointed out the only way for Beijing to root out corruption is to let an independent body -- along the lines of Hong Kong's Independent Commission against Corruption -- handle the investigations. Recent history has demonstrated that because the CCDI and its offshoots are party organs, crooks and scoundrels among cadres who have sterling political connections can often get away with their ill-gotten gains. Jiang's Political Report will only recommend that the CCDI system be improved, not overhauled. Henceforward, senior cadres running provincial, municipal and county-level disciplinary-inspection commissions will be appointed by the CCDI. Up until now, the party boss of a province, city or county, has a big say in picking the cadre who heads the anti-graft commission within his jurisdiction. This so-called "vertical leadership" of the CCDI will at least in theory make it much easier for regional-level disciplinary officials to function free from interference from local party bosses. Jiang's next recommendation for "within-the-party supervision" is formalizing the institution of "roving ombudsmen." Groups of retired senior cadres will periodically make trips to the provinces to see if local governments are carrying out central edicts -- and to check on abuses such as corruption and wastage. What some cynics call the "latter-day imperial plenipotentiaries" are also charged with hearing the grievances of the masses and writing suggestions to the CCP Politburo. Jiang -- and Hu -- evidently believes that the institution of ombudsmen will enable the party to rectify abuses and misconducts in the absence of real democracy. Political ReportSome measures proposed in the Political Report will have the effect of further empowering the CCP. And this runs counter to the report that deposed party chief Zhao Ziyang made to the 13th Party Congress of 1987, still regarded as the high-water mark of liberalization in post-1949 China. A key recommendation of Zhao and his liberals was the separation of party and government -- that CCP organs should beat a strategic retreat from government departments, enterprises and universities. Zhao's suggestions bore the imprimatur of late patriarch Deng Xiaoping, who said after the Tiananmen Square massacre that "not one word of the 13th Congress Report should be changed." Since becoming CCP supremo in 1989, however, Jiang has rolled back the clock by enshrining the principle of party supremacy. The 76-year-old cadre will likely suggest in November that most if not all provincial and municipal party secretaries should simultaneously become heads of the people's congresses -- or legislative assemblies -- in their respective regions. Indeed, more than a dozen party secretaries of China's 30 provinces and directly administered cities already double as the chiefs of their respective congresses. The rationale behind Jiang's retrogressive step is apparently to ensure that the party leadership will have a firmer control of the legislative agenda -- and to ensure that people's congresses can better supervise governments of the same level. China's dilemmaWhich leads to the inevitable question at the core of China's dilemma: but just who will supervise the all-powerful party? At the same time, Jiang will probably have little to offer in areas where the seeds of real democracy may lie. These include introducing competitive elections to pick local-level party bosses as well as upgrading and expanding village elections to the levels of townships and counties. It is an open secret that cadres ranging from Jiang protégé Zeng Qinghong, who heads the party's Organization Department, as well as liberal Politburo member Li Ruihuan, have given their quiet support to more "advanced" models of reform. That Jiang is reluctant to go the distance is also evident from the way elections will be held at the 16th Congress, which begins November 8. One of the main functions of the 2010 congress delegates will be to vote into office a new party Central Committee. As with past practice, the delegates will be given a list of candidates that have been hammered out by the Politburo Standing Committee in consultation with the Organization Department. And the so-called "margin of elimination" will be a mere 5% or so -- meaning that the total candidates will outnumber the actual seats available by only 5%. Bowing to the overwhelming desire of cadres to honor the retire-at-70 rule, Jiang has reportedly taken himself out of the running for Central Committee. This implies that, even if, following the so-called Deng Xiaoping model, the party chief were to retain his chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, he would not be elected either a Central Committee or a Politburo member. However, Jiang has already wangled a pledge out of his colleagues -- including heir-apparent Hu -- that he will remain the CCP's "leadership core" after the 16th Congress. The president's cynical power bid and disregard for institutions and regulations has set a bad example for his younger colleagues -- and indefinitely postponed the day when real reform will blossom in Chinese politics.
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