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Nasty surprises in store for China?
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
HONG KONG, China (CNN) -- While the main outcome of the just-finished 16th Communist Party Congress -- the partial transition of power from President Jiang Zemin to Vice-President Hu Jintao -- was in line with expectations, there were quite a few surprises. And an understanding of how these unexpected if not enigmatic events came to pass could throw light on future developments of Chinese politics. Take, for example, the formation of the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), China's supreme governing council. Since late patriarch Deng Xiaoping kicked off the era of reform in 1978, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always had either a five- or seven-person PSC. And immediately before Jiang went on his U.S. tour last month, a consensus was reached about the seven PSC members: Hu, Vice-premiers Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo, party affairs chief Zeng Qinghong, law-and-order specialist Luo Gan, former Beijing party secretary Jia Qinglin and former Shanghai party secretary Huang Ju. According to a Beijing source close to congress deliberations, the change to a nine-man PSC had to do with the dramatic decline of the political fortune of out-going parliament chief Li Peng, 74. Li, who is still nervous about his role in the June 4, 1989 crackdown -- as well as widespread innuendo about the business activities of his children -- had insisted as a condition of retirement that Luo be put in charge of the Central Commission on Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI). This clumsily named outfit is China's highest anti-corruption agency, whose brief includes investigating the monkey business of senior cadres and their kin. However, quite a few members of the old PSC, including Premier Zhu Rongji – Li's nemesis – as well as Vice-President Hu and the out-going CCDI chief Wei Jianxing, were adamant that the job should not go to Luo. After all, Luo was Li's chief aide when the latter was premier from 1988 to 1998. And there were misgivings that if he were to land the CCDI job, which carries PSC status, Luo might be less than impartial regarding Li's relatives. According to the Beijing source, Zhu and Wei wanted to use their last months in office to crack a number of particularly tough corruption cases. That they were largely successful was evident from police actions against several of Li's former underlings in the energy departments including Gao Yan, the disgraced chief of the State Power Corporation. Immediately upon Jiang's return to China late last month, Zhu, Wei and Hu were able to convince Jiang that public confidence in Beijing's anti-corruption efforts would be affected if Luo were to head the CCDI. Li's enemies were rooting for Shandong party secretary Wu Guanzheng, a 'Mr Clean' who is close to Hu despite not being a member of the latter's Communist Youth League (CYL) Faction.
Apart from being graduates of elite Qinghua University, both Wu and Hu owed their rise in the mid-1980s to friendship with Hu Deping, the son of the late liberal leader and party chief Hu Yaobang. Jiang, who in his speech to the Congress dwelled on corruption being "a matter of life and death for the party," agreed. However, as a sop to Li, Luo would still be given a PSC slot -- and he would continue to hold the law and order portfolio. Since the PSC must have an odd-numbered membership, one more cadre needed to be tapped, and Guangdong party chief Li Changchun, a Jiang affiliate, was a natural choice. Li Changchun was, in addition to Jia, Huang and Wu Guanzheng, a provincial party secretary with Politburo status.
From the perspective of Jiang, whose protégés have taken up five out of nine PSC seats, a larger Standing Committee may make it easier for the Shanghai Faction to control General Secretary Hu. And it is the growing rivalry between Hu and Zeng -- who will one day take over from Jiang as head of the Shanghai Faction -- that is a major reason behind the 76-year-old's decision to retain the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) for a couple more years. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Jiang was half-hearted about adopting the so-called Deng Xiaoping model of succession, a reference to Deng's holding on to the CMC post after quitting his other party and government jobs in the early 1980s. "Jiang, who does not want the world to think he is but mimicking Deng, was amenable to giving up even the CMC post," said a well-placed Beijing editor. "However, his one condition was that while Hu would accede to the chairman's job, Zeng would at the same time be awarded the CMC vice-chairmanship." It is understood that a showdown between Jiang and Hu took place moments before the Congress opened on the 8th -- and the vice-president surprised his septuagenarian boss with the vehemence of his opposition to Zeng's assuming the military post. Although Zeng, at 63, is four years older than Hu, there are indications quite a number of Shanghai Clique stalwarts are making preparations for the former vice-party secretary of Shanghai to take over from Hu at the 17th CCP Congress in 2007. And it is believed that Zeng, who runs the CCP Central Committee Secretariat, is slated to become state vice-president next March. Hu and Zeng have already crossed swords over the series of reshuffles of regional cadres in the past year. As director of the party's Organization Department until last month, Zeng ran afoul of Hu by blocking the elevation of several CYL Faction affiliates. And at the 16th Congress last week, Jiang and Zeng joined forces to prevent Wu Guanzheng from becoming a member of the party Secretariat, the CCP's nerve center. Since the CCDI chief is traditionally a Secretariat member, party insiders were surprised that it was Wu's deputy, He Yong, who had gained a slot in the important organ. In the first Politburo meeting chaired by Hu last weekend, China's top 25 cadres spoke with one voice about abiding by Jiang's instructions and pushing forward with the task of reform. However, the messy transition of power -- particularly the inequitable distribution of top posts among the disparate factions -- that took place at the 16th Congress would seem to guarantee a protracted season of internecine bickering. More surprises -- and probably more nasty than pleasant ones -- are in the offing unless the CCP follows the advice of liberal cadres and academics and adopt measures to democratize its highly Leninist, non-transparent structure.
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