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Who bombed Bali?
By Joe Havely CNN Hong Kong (CNN) -- Until Saturday night the tropical paradise of Bali -- a mainly Hindu island in the midst of the world's most populous Muslim nation -- had been seen as relatively insulated from the religious and ethnic violence that has shaken other parts of Indonesia. That assumption, along with the lives of hundreds of partygoers, was ripped to shreds by the massive bomb placed outside the Sari Club in the resort town of Kuta. Amid the devastation, two questions are being asked -- who could have carried out such an attack, and why target Bali? Dr David Wright-Neville, Senior Research Fellow in the Global Terrorism Project at Australia's Monash University says that on reflection the choice of Bali as a target was an obvious one. "To understand why", he says, "you first have to understand the main objective of the likely perpetrators -- that is, to destabilize the secular government of [President] Megawati Sukarnoputri." Despite the rush to conclude that the bombing was an attack on the West, Wright-Neville says the primary reason for the bombing was as part of a coordinated effort by Islamic militants to undermine the Indonesian government. "Their aim," he says, "is to spread a level of chaos; to foment conflict between different religious groups and make governance so impossible that Indonesia's majority Muslims will rally behind a hardline Islamic alternative." Beyond that, the decision to attack such an obviously "Western" target was largely secondary, although still highly significant. HotspotBy choosing a tourist hotspot famed for its nightclubs and freewheeling bars, Wright-Neville says whoever carried out the attack, "wanted to send a message that would resonate with the West and that would send a general statement against 'debauched' Western lifestyles." Furthermore, by attacking tourism, one of crisis-hit Indonesia's top earners, the bombers also hit a key economic target that pours millions of dollars a year into the nation's coffers. Put those considerations together, says Wright-Neville, and the obvious target is Bali -- specifically the Kuta district so popular with visiting young backpackers and surfers. With hindsight that may be an obvious conclusion -- but does it make it any clearer who could have carried out the attack and who would have the resources to do so? Wright-Neville, who has studied the growth of terror networks in Southeast Asia for several years, says that while caution is still necessary, the pattern of attacks points to one obvious suspect. "All the evidence points to the Jemaah Islamiah (JI). There is no other group that has the motivation to carry out such an attack," he says. Al Qaeda linksIntelligence officials in the region and in the United States believe the JI, which aims to create a hardline pan-Islamic super-state in Southeast Asia, has close ties to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network. Several of its operatives are thought to have received training at terrorist camps in Afghanistan in the mid- to late-1990s and, analysts say, the group in known to have an operational agreement with al Qaeda. That much became known following the interrogation of several JI members arrested earlier this year in Singapore for plotting attacks on American targets there. Western intelligence officials believe the group is led by radical Islamic cleric Abu Bakar Baasyir. However, the Indonesian government has to date taken no action against him for fear of upsetting the majority of moderate Muslims who live across the sprawling archipelago. Terror tactics
According to Wright-Neville, JI is the only group that has the motivation, the organizational capability and the training -- as a result of its al Qaeda connections -- to carry out the Bali bombings. Furthermore, he says, the "coordinated, almost simultaneous nature of the attacks is important" because it shows the JI's determination to carry out attacks across Indonesia and "demonstrate its archipelagic nature.". The three bombings in Bali came just hours after a blast outside a Philippine consulate on the island of Sulawesi -- a relatively minor event on its own, but seen in the broader context part of a pattern of at least seven bombings across the region in the past three weeks. Analysts say that too points to an al Qaeda connection with coordinated, simultaneous bombings a key tactic outlined in a terrorist training manual recovered in Afghanistan. There have also been suggestions from some quarters that the timing of the attack, exactly two years after the attack on the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden, is further evidence of role of al Qaeda in the Bali attack. However, Wright-Neville is skeptical that the timing is anything more that coincidence. "The JI's order of battle is to go for unexpected attacks," he says. "The attack was almost certainly not carried out with a mind to the anniversary of the Cole bombing." Rather, he said, the aim of the Bali bombing was to send a message to Indonesia's Muslims and the Indonesian government of the JI's capabilities. Body of evidenceSo with a mounting pattern of attacks, had there been any warning that an attack on the scale of Bali was in the offing? With hindsight, says Wright Neville, "yes -- there had been a growing body of evidence that something was afoot." However, the problem was that much of the evidence became mixed up with a tide of false information that has become as much an important part of JI's armory and strategy as explosives and firearms. That stretched Indonesia's already limited intelligence services well beyond their means, unable to tell the difference between fact and fiction. The Bali bombings were a wake-up call, Wright Neville says. "We now know that terrorist groups in the region are a lot more advanced than had been previously thought," he says. "We had assumed that Southeast Asia was a new theatre in the war on terrorism -- after Saturday's bombings we now know it is at the forefront of the war."
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